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DISPERSANTS: THE LESSER OF TWO EVILS OR A 
CURE WORSE THAN THE DISEASE? 
Catherine Kilduff  and Jaclyn Lopez* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The April 20, 2010, BP oil spill is widely regarded as the nation’s 
worst environmental disaster. The explosion of the Deepwater Horizon 
oil rig resulted in the death of eleven crewmen, and thousands of fish, sea 
turtles, birds, and marine mammals.1 The federal government estimates 
that 4.9 million barrels (or 205.8 million gallons) of oil spilled into the 
Gulf of Mexico from the rogue well.2 In addition to the direct effect on 
wildlife from the spilled oil, which includes reduced ability to regulate 
temperature, forage, and nest, the unprecedented application of 
dispersants also likely impacted wildlife. During the oil spill, BP released 
roughly 1.84 million gallons of dispersants into the Gulf, 1.07 million 
gallons to the surface and 771,000 subsea.3 The Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) approved these measures despite its admission 
that no one fully knew the environmental effects of the dispersants, 
                                            
 * Catherine Kilduff and Jaclyn Lopez are staff attorneys at the Center for Biological 
Diversity and contributed equally to this article. 
 1. See generally Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Deepwater Horizon 
Response Consolidated Fish and Wildlife Collection Report, NOAA DEEPWATER 
HORIZON ARCHIVE, http://www.noaa.gov/deepwaterhorizon/wildlife/index.html (last 
visited Mar. 4, 2011) (providing cumulative data on wildlife affected by the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill from May 2010 to November 2010).  
 2. Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, U.S. Scientific Teams Refine Estimates of Oil 
Flow from BP’s Well Prior to Capping (Aug. 2, 2010), available at 
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/US-Scientific-Teams-Refine-Estimates-of-Oil-
Flow-from-BP-Well-Prior-to-Capping.cfm. 
 3. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, THE USE OF SURFACE AND SUBSEA DISPERSANTS DURING THE BP DEEPWATER 
HORIZON OIL SPILL, STAFF WORKING PAPER NO. 4, 12 (2011), available at 
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/document/use-surface-and-subsea-dispersants-
during-bp-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill [hereinafter STAFF WORKING PAPER NO. 4]. 
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particularly at such great depths or volumes.4 Lisa Jackson, EPA 
administrator, called her decision to approve BP’s subsea dispersant use 
the hardest decision she ever made.5 
As days turned to weeks and the oil continued to spill, it became 
obvious that both BP and the government were woefully unprepared to 
respond to a spill of this magnitude.6  The horror and chaos of the oil 
spill put the government in the awkward position of leading the efforts to 
respond to the spill while relying on industry resources and expertise.7 
This also resulted in a tug-of-war within the Obama Administration 
between its enforcement and regulation roles and its need to cooperate 
with BP in order to stop the flow of oil and recover from the spill.8 The 
use of subsea dispersants most clearly exemplified this conflict as the 
government’s lack of knowledge about the effects of dispersants made it 
almost impossible for it to fulfill its legal duty to protect the nation’s 
waters and wildlife from pollutants.  
Two U.S. federal laws, the Clean Water Act (CWA)9 and the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA),10 contain provisions that specifically 
ensure that dispersant approval and use will not jeopardize imperiled 
wildlife and the resources on which they depend.  In light of the general 
lack of knowledge regarding the effects of dispersants used in response 
to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and the harm they may have caused, 
it has become evident that these two environmental laws, their 
implementation, or both, were inadequate to safeguard the environment 
and wildlife from the disaster response.  
This Article examines the use of dispersants in response to the BP oil 
spill. The authors describe the ways in which the CWA and the ESA 
                                            
 4. Id. at 1-2, 4. 
 5. Jeff Goodell, The Poisoning, ROLLING STONE, July 21, 2010, 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-poisoning-20100721. 
 6. See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE 
DRILLING 182 (2011), available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/ 
files/documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter FINAL 
REPORT]. 
 7. Id. at 134-35 (noting that while the Coast Guard has the option under 40 C.F.R. § 
300.305(d) to “federalize” the spill—conducting and funding all aspects of the response 
and later seeking reimbursement from the responsible party—the Coast Guard preferred 
to view BP as a “co-combatant in the fight against the oil”). 
 8. Id. at 136 (“Though the Coast Guard and MMS believed they had to work closely 
with BP, others in government did not share this view of the relationship with the 
responsible party.”). 
 9. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1381 (2006). 
 10. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2007). 
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authorize the EPA to regulate the use of dispersants and suggest how the 
regulation of dispersants could be strengthened. Part II discusses the 
development of contingency plans for oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico 
and the pre-spill consultation process for dispersants’ effects on wildlife. 
Part III describes BP’s dispersant use in response to the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill and recent scientific research identifying potential 
effects on the ocean and marine wildlife. Part IV discusses lessons 
learned from the oil spill and concludes that future preparedness will 
require better agency implementation or even legislative action. 
II.  STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING DISPERSANTS: THE 
CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
A.  The Clean Water Act 
With respect to the use of dispersants, the CWA has seemingly 
conflicting mandates. The CWA prohibits the discharge of pollutants into 
navigable waters,11 but also authorizes the President to allow the 
application of dispersants to water in the event of an oil spill.12 The broad 
authority that the CWA provides for the mitigation of oil spills is a 
testament to the devastation the spills can cause. This authority, however, 
is not completely unfettered; the CWA requires prior planning for 
dispersant use. Response activities must be conducted pursuant to a 
National Contingency Plan (NCP), and the EPA is charged with listing 
dispersants on the NCP Product Schedule as part of its preparation of the 
NCP.13 While the listing of a dispersant on the schedule does not 
constitute EPA’s approval of the product for use on an oil spill,14 it is a 
prerequisite that makes the product lawfully available for use in oil spill 
response activities.15  
B.  Listing Dispersants on the Product Schedule 
EPA regulations require that a dispersant product on the schedule be 
at least 45 percent effective, and that the toxicity testing results factor 
                                            
 11. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (2006); see also 40 C.F.R. § 110.3 (2010) (defining 
harmful discharges under the Act). 
 12. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)-(d). 
 13. Id. § 1321(d); see also 40 C.F.R. § 300.905(a) (regulations requiring NCP Product 
Schedule). 
 14. 40 C.F.R. § 300.920(e). 
 15. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(2)(G). 
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into the product’s effectiveness value.16 The toxicity testing is not 
intended to estimate the dispersant’s ecosystem effects, but merely tests 
for acute toxicity within forty-eight and ninety-six hours.17 The tests do 
not consider environmental persistence, effectiveness with multiple 
varieties of oil and at multiple temperatures, byproducts, or endocrine 
effects.18 While the industry is responsible for toxicity testing, the EPA 
retains the right to conduct its own testing to verify industry results and 
to weigh EPA testing results in determining whether the product meets 
listing criteria.19   
The EPA currently lists fifteen dispersants on the NCP Product 
Schedule, two of which belong to the Corexit brand and are the two 
dispersants BP used most heavily in response to its oil spill.20 Corexit 
9500 was listed on April 13, 1994, and was relisted on December 18, 
1995, under the name Corexit 9500A.21 Corexit 9527 was listed on 
March 10, 1978, and was relisted on December 18, 1995, and is now 
listed under the name Corexit EC9527A.22 The EPA’s NCP Product 
Schedule guide indicates that Corexit 9500A and 9527A are most 
appropriate for surface application and have an average effectiveness rate 
of around 50 percent.23 It also recommends the application volume for 
Corexit 9500A and 9527A is two to ten gallons per acre.24 
C.  Contingency Plans for the Gulf of Mexico 
The NCP also requires the development of Area Contingency Plans 
(ACPs), prepared by a designated “Area Committee” comprised of 
federal, local, and state officials and approved by the EPA and the Coast 
Guard.25 In addition to ACPs, Regional Response Teams (RRTs) are 
                                            
 16. 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.905(a), 300.915(a)(8), 300.920, 300.920(a). 
 17. 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. C, 3.1.  
 18. STAFF WORKING PAPER NO. 4, supra note 3, at 6. 
 19. 40 C.F.R. § 300.920(a). 
 20. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, National Contingency Plan Product Schedule, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (May 11, 2011), 
http://www.epa.gov/oem/docs/oil/ncp/schedule.pdf. 
 21. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, COREXIT® EC9500A, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/ncp/products/corex950.htm. 
 22. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, COREXIT® EC9527A, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/ncp/products/corex952.htm. 
 23. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDE TO USING THE NCP PRODUCT SCHEDULE 
NOTEBOOK 10-12, 20-22 (2011), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oem/docs/oil/ncp/notebook.pdf.  
 24. Id. at 12.  
 25. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(4). 
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responsible for developing and maintaining Regional Contingency Plans 
(RCPs).26 The RCPs “follow the format of the NCP” and coordinate 
response between state emergency plans and area-specific contingency 
plans.27 An RCP must be developed for each EPA region, in addition to a 
separate RCP for Alaska.28 For example, the approved RCPs for EPA 
Region 4 (Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida) and Region 6 (including 
Louisiana and Texas) guided BP’s dispersant use in the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill.29  
EPA and the Coast Guard, as co-chairs of the Region 4 RRT, 
approved the Regional Response Team Oil Spill Dispersant Use Policy 
(Region 4 Policy) in 1996.30 The Region 4 Policy “preauthorizes limited 
use of dispersants by the pre-designated United States Coast Guard On-
Scene Coordinator (OSC) on oil discharges impacting Federal waters and 
other specifically designated areas.”31 The Region 4 Policy specified that 
further consultation would not be required for dispersant use within pre-
authorized areas so long as the appropriate RRT agencies are 
immediately notified and applicable protocols followed.32 Dispersant use 
is pre-authorized for “green zone” areas, which are defined as offshore 
areas at least three miles from shore, outside state jurisdictions, where 
the water is at least ten meters deep.33 In “yellow zones,” the Coast 
Guard must request authorization from the RRT.34 Yellow zones are 
waters under state or federal special management, such as wildlife 
refuges, National Park Service areas, or proposed or designated critical 
habitats; waters within three miles of shore or within state jurisdiction; 
or, waters less than ten meters deep.35 Dispersant use is prohibited in “red 
zones” unless necessary to prevent or mitigate risk to human health or 
safety.36 No red zones have been designated.37   
                                            
 26. 40 C.F.R. § 300.210(b). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. STAFF WORKING PAPER NO. 4, supra note 3, at 6. 
 30. REGION IV REGIONAL RESPONSE TEAM, USE OF DISPERSANTS IN REGION IV (1996).  
 31. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. & Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Biological Assessment 
of Effects on Listed Species of Region IV Regional Response Team Oil Spill Dispersant 
Use Policy, in USE OF DISPERSANTS IN REGION IV, 32, 33, 72 (1996).  
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. at 33-34.   
 34. Id. at 34.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. at 34-35. 
 37. Id.  
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Region 6 re-approved its Dispersant Pre-Approval Guidelines and 
Checklist (Region 6 Guidelines) on January 24, 2001.38 The Region 6 
Guidelines provide pre-approval authority to the Federal On Scene 
Coordinator (FOSC) for dispersant use in the U.S. Exclusive Economic 
Zone off the Texas and Louisiana coasts.  Under the Guidelines, “[t]he 
only requirement for dispersant product selection is that the dispersant 
must be included on the NCP Product Schedule and considered 
appropriate by the FOSC for existing environmental and physical 
conditions.”39 The guidelines contemplate surface application of 
dispersants, setting forth pre-approval criteria for aerial spraying and 
surface boat spray systems.40  While “alternative platforms” may be 
considered, none are specified or discussed.41 
D.  The Endangered Species Act 
Congress intended that the ESA protect and conserve species from 
extinction. Accordingly, section 7 of the ESA requires federal agencies 
to engage in consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and 
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) (collectively, the Services) to 
ensure that “any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency 
. . . is not likely to jeopardize” any listed species or adversely modify 
critical habitat.42  In order for an agency’s action to trigger the 
consultation requirements of section 7(a)(2), the action must be both an 
affirmative action and discretionary.43  Section 7(a)(2) typically applies 
                                            
 38. FEDERAL REGION VI REGIONAL RESPONSE TEAM, FOSC DISPERSANT PRE-
APPROVAL GUIDELINES AND CHECKLIST 1 (2001) [hereinafter REGION VI GUIDELINES]. 
 39. Id. at 1.  
 40. Id. at 2-3, 14. 
 41. This led to confusion during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, because the EPA 
believed that the RRT did not preauthorize the subsea application of dispersants and 
wanted the ultimate approval to come from a higher level within the EPA; meanwhile the 
responders were left without clear communication or immediate direction from the EPA. 
FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 145. 
 42. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
 43. “In order for section 7(a)(2) to apply, there must be discretionary federal agency 
action. Federal agency ‘action’ is defined by regulation and broadly construed by the 
courts to include any action in which there is some federal discretionary involvement or 
control. . . . [A]n agency’s action must be ‘affirmative’; an agency that is merely 
providing advice or declining to act in a certain way is generally not engaging in agency 
action subject to section 7.” Patrick W. Ryan and Erika E. Malmen, Interagency 
Consultation Under Section 7, in ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY AND 
PERSPECTIVES 105-106 (Donald C. Baur & Wm. Robert Irvin, eds., 2d ed. 2010); see also 
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 649 (2007). 
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to ongoing agency action as well as programmatic agency action that 
guides or constrains subsequent activities, so long as the challenged 
federal agency retains discretionary control to make decisions that could 
inure to the benefit of ESA-listed species and critical habitat.44  
To fulfill this mandate, the acting agency first prepares a biological 
assessment to determine whether the action “may affect” a listed species, 
and if so, the agency must initiate consultation with either FWS or 
NMFS, depending on the species involved.45  At the completion of 
consultation, FWS or NMFS will issue either a written statement 
concurring that the action is not likely to adversely affect a species, or a 
biological opinion that determines if the agency action is likely to 
jeopardize the species.46  If jeopardy is found, the opinion must specify 
reasonable and prudent alternatives that will avoid jeopardy and allow 
the agency to proceed with the action.47 
In 2001, the EPA and the Coast Guard entered into an Interagency 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) outlining ESA consultation 
procedures for preparing oil spill Contingency Plans.48  Pursuant to the 
MOA, the EPA and the Coast Guard must initiate informal consultation 
with the Services when drafting an ACP if any endangered and 
threatened animal may be affected by the plan.49  During consultation, 
the EPA, the Coast Guard, and the Services must identify sensitive areas 
and methods to avoid adverse impacts on listed wildlife.50  If “potential 
adverse effects are identified and removed,” the Services will provide a 
concurrence letter, but if not, formal ESA consultation must be 
undertaken.51  
The Region 4 RRT, including the EPA and the Coast Guard, 
conducted biological assessments (Region 4 BA) of the effects of the 
Region 4 policy on species under the jurisdiction of the Services.52  
                                            
 44. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2009). 
 45. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a). 
 46. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14. 
 47. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h)(3). 
 48. See Memorandum of Agreement Between U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Serv., Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Nat’l Ocean Serv., and Dep’t of the Interior 
Regarding Oil Spill Planning and Response Activities Under the Fed. Water Pollution 
Control Act’s Nat’l Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan and the 
Endangered Species Act (2001) [hereinafter MOA]. 
 49. Id. at 5. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 6. 
 52. See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., BIOLOGICAL 
ASSESSMENTS AND SECTION 7 CONSULTATION FOR THREATENED AND ENDANGERED 
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Notably, the assumptions made in the Region 4 BA regarding the 
amounts of dispersants that would be applied, the depth at which they 
would be applied, and the duration of wildlife and ecosystem exposure 
did not hold true for the Deepwater Horizon response.  The Region 4 BA 
assumed that dispersants would largely be applied at the surface of the 
water in moderate amounts early in the spill response effort.  For 
example, the Region 4 BA assumed that food chain effects from prey 
contamination were unlikely due to “low concentrations and short 
duration of exposure to dispersed oil.”53  The Region 4 BA also 
concluded that dispersants would not likely cause significant additional 
harm to birds or fur-bearing mammals, despite destroying their ability to 
insulate themselves or repel water, because “[w]ithin the normal range of 
operating dosages, biological effects are due to the dispersed oil, not the 
dispersant.”54  The Region 4 BA acknowledged that sea turtles could 
experience higher exposure to oil and dispersants in the water column 
after dispersant application, but simply assumed that “exposure will be 
short-term and concentrations low” due to rapid dilution.55 
Based on these assumptions—and scant information regarding 
dispersant effects in general—the Region 4 BA concluded that dispersant 
use “under appropriate conditions” was “not likely to adversely affect 
listed species beyond the potential effects of the spilled oil or add to the 
cumulative environmental stresses currently acting on the species.”56  
The document also specified that consultation “will be re-initiated if 
additional information not previously considered becomes available 
indicating adverse effects to listed species or critical habitat from the 
identified action.”57 
Similarly, the “Bioassessment of the Potential Impacts Resulting 
from Dispersant Use in Offshore Waters in the Gulf of Mexico” (Region 
6 BA) findings are based on the assumption that dispersants would be 
applied to the surface of the ocean and at “recommended” application 
rates.58  The Region 6 BA bases its evaluation of species’ risk from 
                                                                                                  
SPECIES, in OCEAN AND COASTAL WATERS DISPERSANT USE, REGION IV REGIONAL 
RESPONSE TEAM 35. 
 53. Id. at 40; see also id. at 84. 
 54. Id. at 39. 
 55. Id. at 83. 
 56. Id. at 85-86. 
 57. Id. at 86. 
 58. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., BIOASSESSMENT 
OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS RESULTING FROM DISPERSANT USE IN OFFSHORE WATERS IN 
THE GULF OF MEXICO, in RRT-6 FOSC DISPERSANT USE PRE-APPROVAL GUIDELINES AND 
CHECKLIST, REGIONAL RESPONSE TEAM VI, app. 5-9. 
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dispersant effects largely on whether the species lives at the surface or in 
offshore waters.  For example, it assumes that sea turtles, sperm whales, 
and red snapper are only at “medium” risk of being directly affected by 
dispersant use because sea turtles were thought to have low numbers 
habitating offshore, and sperm whales and red snapper were thought to 
prefer deep water habitat.59  The Region 6 BA found that important prey 
species, such as Gulf menhaden and blue crabs, had a high risk of 
negative impacts from dispersant use, because these organisms are found 
in the water column in offshore waters.60  The Region 6 BA did not 
discuss particular impacts to sea turtles or marine mammals, relying 
instead on a 1994 statement by NMFS, made in response to a request for 
ESA consultation, that “the species under our purview are not likely to 
be adversely affected by the use of chemical countermeasures in 
response to an oil spill.”61  The Region 6 BA also discounted the 
likelihood that dispersants could adversely affect birds.62 
The MOA authorizes emergency ESA consultations, pursuant to 50 
C.F.R. § 402.05, for oil spill response activities.63  When listed species or 
critical habitat are, or could be, present in the area affected by the spill, 
the FOSC designated under the NCP must initiate emergency ESA 
consultation by contacting the Services.64  The NOAA regional response 
coordinator and scientific support coordinator are tasked with 
coordinating species expertise, which may involve participation by 
Services staff from local field offices as well as Services participation in 
the FOSC Incident Command System.65 
PART III:  THE IMPACTS OF DISPERSANTS ON WILDLIFE 
A.  The Use of Dispersants in Response to the BP Oil Spill 
Dispersants are one of several tools authorized for use in response to 
oil spills. However, the use of dispersants in response to the BP oil spill 
was in sharp contrast in methodology, scale, and scope to anything the 
EPA or Coast Guard had envisioned or considered in the past.  In the 
first few weeks of the oil spill, the federal government simply deferred to 
BP’s choice of dispersants and their use.  Indeed, on May 10, the EPA 
                                            
 59. Id. at app. 7.  
 60. Id. at app. 8.  
 61. Id. at app. 13.  
 62. Id. at app. 13-14.   
 63. MOA, supra note 48, at 7; see also 50 C.F.R. § 402.05. 
 64. MOA, supra note 48, at 7. 
 65. Id.  
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issued BP a directive essentially authorizing what amounted to a large-
scale scientific experiment in the Gulf of Mexico, under which BP was 
required to determine that subsurface dispersant application was 
chemically breaking up the oil and then to sample and delineate the 
dispersed plume.66  The directive also called for BP to consult the RRT if 
dissolved oxygen near the plume fell below 2 mg/L or if toxicity tests 
revealed “excessive exertion of a toxic response.”67  David Valentine, a 
geomicrobiologist at the University of California, Santa Barbara, 
described BP’s use of dispersants as “an experiment that’s never been 
performed before—to dump that much of an industrial chemical into the 
ocean.”68  
BP’s early reports failed to satisfy the EPA’s requirements, and 
toxicity tests soon revealed that the Corexit dispersants had potential to 
kill up to 25 percent of organisms living five hundred feet below the 
surface in areas where the dispersants were used.69  The EPA Product 
Schedule ranked Corexit 9500A and 9527A as more toxic and less 
effective than other EPA-approved dispersants for use on Louisiana 
Sweet Crude (LSC), the type of oil that spewed from BP’s broken well.70  
These dispersants are known toxins to wildlife. Corexit 9527A contains 
2-butoxyethanol, which ruptures red blood cells, and in high, yet realistic 
concentrations, can be more toxic than crude oil alone.71 Notably, BP 
                                            
 66. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DISPERSANT MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT 
DIRECTIVE FOR SUBSURFACE DISPERSANT APPLICATION 1 (May 10, 2010).  
 67. Id. at 3.   
 68. Amanda Mascarelli, Debate Grows Over Impact of Dispersed Oil, NATURE, July 
10, 2010, http://www.nature.com/news/2010/100710/full/news.2010.347.html. 
 69. Matt Gutman, Lee Farren & Bradley Blackburn, EPA May Not Force BP to 
Change Dispersants, ABC NEWS, May 21, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/WN/epz-bp-
dispersants/story?id=10711367; BP SAMPLING RESULTS (IN VARIOUS FORMATS) FROM MAY 
15 TO AUGUST 31, BP’S ANALYSIS OF SUBSURFACE DISPERSANT USE, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/dispersants-bp.html (last updated Jan. 
10, 2011) (showing 75 percent rotifer survival at 500 feet on May 15, 2010).  
 70. National Contingency Plan Product Schedule Toxicity and Effectiveness 
Summaries, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/emergencies/content/ncp/tox_tables.htm (last updated Mar. 30, 
2011). 
 71. See, e.g., Peter H. Albers, Effects of Corexit 9527 on the Hatchability of Mallard 
Eggs, 23 BULLETIN OF ENVTL. CONTAMINATION AND TOXICOLOGY 661 (1979); S. 
Bhattacharya et al., Toxicity to Freshwater Organisms from Oils and Oil Spills Chemical 
Treatments in Laboratory Microcosms, 122 ENVTL. POLLUTION 122, 205 (2003); Mace G. 
Barron et al., 2003, Photoenhanced Toxicity of Aqueous Phase and Chemically Dispersed 
Weathered Alaska North Slope Crude Oil to Pacific Herring Eggs and Larvae, 22 ENVTL. 
TOXICOLOGY AND CHEMISTRY, 650 (2003); Ruth I. Ibemesim & Joseph F. Bamidele, 
Comparative Toxicity of Two Oil Types and Two Dispersants on the Growth of a 
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stopped using Corexit 9527A early in the response because of alleged 
health effects on workers in the Exxon-Valdez response.72  Multiple 
studies on the effects of Corexit 9500A have concluded that its use 
increased the exposure of fish to the polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons 
(PAHs) found in crude oil.73  
One of the many complaints about Corexit was that “[w]e already 
know that dispersants are less toxic than oil if you compare the two. . . . 
[b]ut because Corexit contains a petroleum solvent, we’re actually 
putting petroleum solvent on top of a petroleum spill. So it’s increasing 
the hydrocarbons in the water column.”74 Dispersants can release toxic 
break-down products, such as PAHs from oil, which can make dispersed 
oil even more harmful than oil left untreated.75 Furthermore, these 
dispersants can actually facilitate the entry of oil into the body of 
                                                                                                  
Seashore Grass, Paspalum vaginatum, 2008 INT’L OIL SPILL CONFERENCE 875 (2008); 
R.A. Khan & J.F. Payne, Influence of a Crude Oil Dispersant, Corexit 9527, and 
Dispersed Oil on Capelin (Mallotus villosus), Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua), Longhorn 
sculpin (Myoxocephalus octodecemspinosus), and cunner (Tautogolabrus adspersus), 75 
BULLETIN OF ENVTL.. CONTAMINATION AND TOXICOLOGY 50 (2005); Ismail Gulec & 
Douglas A. Holdway, Toxicity of Dispersant, Oil and Dispersed Oil to Two Marine 
Organisms, 1997 INTERNATIONAL OIL SPILL CONFERENCE 1010 (1997); Alexander A. 
Venn et al., P-glycoprotein (Multi-xenobiotic Resistance) and Heat Shock Protein Gene 
Expression in the Reef Coral Montastraea franksi in Response to Environmental 
Toxicants, 93 AQUATIC TOXICOLOGY 188 (2009). 
 72. STAFF WORKING PAPER NO. 4, supra note 3, at 8. 
 73. See generally Shahunthala D. Ramachandran et al., Oil Dispersant Increases PAH 
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animals.76 In addition, the ingredients in the Corexit dispersants were not 
initially disclosed; instead, ingredients were listed in a group rather than 
as a single chemical.77 Scientists were concerned that without knowing 
the actual ingredients, it would not be possible to truly asses the human 
health or environmental effects.78 Eventually Nalco, the company that 
manufactures Corexit, caved to public pressure and disclosed Corexit’s 
ingredients.79 
Despite these concerns, on May 15, 2010, the EPA authorized BP to 
use dispersants sub-surface at the wellhead under the premise that by 
injecting dispersants at the source of the oil, less dispersants would be 
needed.80 Five days later, under pressure from an outraged public and 
concerned scientific experts, the EPA issued an addendum to its directive 
giving BP twenty hours to identify more effective and less toxic 
dispersants on the Product Schedule.81 Just one day earlier, BP had 
applied 70,000 gallons of dispersants in a single day.82 However, BP 
refused to use other dispersants claiming that they were either more 
environmentally damaging or not available in sufficient quantity.83 
One week later, the EPA directed BP to reduce dispersant use by 75 
percent from daily peak use by eliminating surface application and 
limiting subsurface application to 15,000 gallons per day.84 The EPA 
reports that over the next month, BP reduced its dispersant use 68 
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AGENCY (May 15, 2010), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/bd4379a92ceceeac 
8525735900400c27/f29adfca80ccd1a685257726004f0617!OpenDocument.  
 81. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DISPERSANT MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT 
DIRECTIVE – ADDENDUM 2 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/dispersants/ 
directive-addendum2.pdf. 
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Superfund Div., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (May 20, 2010), available at 
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percent.85 The reason for the discrepancy was BP’s frequent request for, 
and approval of, exemptions from the Coast Guard and EPA, which had 
the final approval authority.86 Congressman Edward J. Markey chastised 
Admiral Thad Allen, National Incident Commander, for allowing surface 
application “virtually every day since the Directive was issued on May 
26, 2010,” until the flow of oil from the well was stopped.87 
Congressman Markey noted that in forty-eight days, BP, the Houma 
Unified Command, or both, made seventy-four requests for exemptions, 
and that in all but ten cases the Coast Guard approved the exemption 
without modifying the requested daily maximum quantities of 
dispersants. Additionally, in one of those ten cases, the Coast Guard 
increased the maximum dispersant use requested from 30,600 gallons to 
43,000 gallons.88 
While Congressman Markey was clearly challenging the Coast 
Guard’s apparent rubberstamping of the exemptions, the Coast Guard 
was complaining that the approval process was not fast enough. On June 
22, 2010, citing hardship and delay in the exemption approval process, 
Rear Admiral James Watson, the FOSC, asked the Region 6 RRT to draft 
a new addendum to “empower incident commanders to make real-time 
decisions to use appropriate amounts of dispersants” and “allow the use 
of dispersants to appropriately control volatile organic compounds.”89  
Despite Watson’s request for more flexibility regarding quantities of 
dispersants, on June 23, 2010, the government issued “Guidance on 
Subsea Dispersant Application” which maintained the 15,000 gallon per 
day subsea dispersant limit but allowed increases in the application rate 
where winds were less than ten knots or where volatile organic 
compound (VOC) readings indicated potential health concerns.90  In 
                                            
 85. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA’s Toxicity Testing of Dispersants, U.S. ENVTL. 
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 87. Letter from Edward J. Markey, Congressman, to Thad Allen, Admiral, U.S. Coast 
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 89. Letter from James A. Watson, Fed. On-Scene Coordinator, Rear Admiral, U.S. 
Coast Guard, to Reg’l Response Team, Fed. Region VI (June 22, 2010), available at 
http://markey.house.gov/images/DISPERSANTDOCUMENTSJUNE22-24.pdf.  
 90. Letter from Douglas J. Suttles, BP Chief Operating Officer, to James A. Watson, 
Fed. On-Scene Coordinator, Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard (June 23, 2010), available 
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reply to Congressman Markey’s concerns, Admiral Allen noted that a 
FOSC must strike a balance between limiting the use of dispersants and 
protecting human health and safety at risk from sending responders 
closer to a hazardous environment.91 
On July 6, 2010, BP responded to EPA’s request for BP to provide a 
“high-level description of its plans going forward with regard to the use 
of dispersants.”92  BP assured the government that under all conditions, 
the use of subsea dispersants would be held under the 15,000 gallon limit 
but that, “it is critical that we maintain the capabilities to apply subsea 
dispersant to meet unforeseen contingencies such as weather disruptions 
or equipment failures.”93 Essentially, BP agreed to reduce dispersant use 
only if it successfully reduced the oil release and to stay within the 
15,000 gallon limit only if circumstances allowed it.  
The conflict over dispersant use continued throughout the oil spill 
response.94 The final exchanges over dispersants included the 
government’s denial of a BP request to apply 10,000 gallons of 
dispersants to oil slicks.95 This generated a reply from the FOSC, 
protesting over the removal of dispersants from the response tool kit.96 
Ultimately the government prohibited BP from using any dispersants the 
day before BP capped the well.97  
B.  Dispersant Impacts to Species and Humans 
In the hours following an oil spill, some of the oil disperses naturally 
due to wave action and ocean turbulence. Chemical dispersants are 
typically applied to the surface of the water to enhance the natural 
dispersion process by breaking down the oil into more fine droplets. 
Dispersed oil is less likely to reach nearshore and shoreline areas and is 
thought to minimize the direct contact wildlife have with the spilled oil.   
                                                                                                  
without obtaining concurrence of the EPA and state RRT representatives where use of a 
product is necessary “to prevent or substantially reduce a hazard to human life”). 
 91. Letter from Thad Allen, Nat’l Incident Commander, Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, 
to Edward Markey, Congressman (Oct. 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/ 
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 92. Letter from Doug Suttles, BP Chief Operating Officer, to James Watson, Fed. On-
Site Coordinator, Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard (July 6, 2010), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/34931289/2010-07-06-Suttles-Watson.  
 93. Id. 
 94. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 160-61. 
 95. Id. at 161. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
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Oil is highly toxic to most life forms. Specifically, the chemicals in 
crude oil, namely PAHs and VOCs, can damage major life systems and 
even prove fatal.98 For example, during and after the BP oil spill, there 
were reports of high amounts of benzene, a carcinogen found in crude 
oil, and reports of people having difficulty breathing, headaches, internal 
bleeding, nausea, and other extreme symptoms.99 The chemical 
compounds found in petroleum can affect the nervous system, 
reproductive system, circulatory system, endocrine system, 
gastrointestinal system, musculoskeletal system, and hematopoietic 
system.100 This damage can be acute or chronic, and can manifest within 
moments or years.101 Moreover, the effects of oil can occur through 
physical contact or contact via the food web.102  
Dispersants themselves are also toxic, and can increase the toxicity 
of oil. Some dispersants contain nonylphenol ethoxylates which degrade 
into estrogenic compounds or endocrine disruptors.103 Furthermore, 
dispersants can make it easier for oil to move through the skin of living 
organisms.104 Currently, the precise effect of the use of dispersants, 
especially at the extreme volumes and depths BP applied them, are 
unknown.105 Even EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson admitted “[w]e are 
still deeply concerned about these things we don’t know. The long-term 
effect on aquatic life are still unknown, and we must make sure that the 
dispersants that are used are as non-toxic as possible.”106 
Dispersants may have increased the volume of oil in deepwater 
plumes—highly dispersed oil droplets and dissolved gases between 
thirty-two hundred and forty-two hundred feet deep and extending for 
many miles—with unknown effects on the deepwater environment.107 
The plumes of oil droplets and dispersants can engulf small plankton, 
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fish eggs, and larvae. Loss of these food sources can cause a chain 
reaction affecting organisms throughout the food web.108  
Also unknown is the biodegradation rate of dispersants 
themselves.109 While LSC is reported to degrade in twelve to seventy 
days in seawater, and chemical dispersants can speed its degradation,110 
prior to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, no deepwater applications of 
dispersant had been conducted, and thus no data existed on the 
environmental impacts of dispersants in deepwater.111 Since the oil spill, 
scientists have discovered that a chemical component of the dispersants, 
the surfactant dioctyl sodium sulfosuccinate (DOSS) remained in the 
water sixty-four days after BP ceased applying dispersants.112 Scientists 
found DOSS up to 300 kilometers from the well where it was applied, 
and concluded that rates of biodegradation have been negligible or slow.  
An August 4, 2010, interagency report claimed that approximately 
74 percent of the spilled oil was gone.113 Internal emails regarding the 
report showed that NOAA Administrator Jane Lubchenco objected to 
this portrayal, saying that “[f]ifty percent of it is gone—either evaporated 
or burned, skimmed or recovered from the wellhead. 24 percent has been 
dispersed, and although much of this is in the process of being degraded, 
it is not ‘gone’ yet.”114 This disagreement illustrates one controversy 
regarding the use of dispersants: dispersed oil may be less visible, but 
that decreased visibility does not necessarily mean that the oil is gone 
altogether. 
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PART IV:  LESSONS LEARNED 
It is evident that BP and the government were unprepared for the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The complicated and critical question now 
is how can industry, government, and the public better prepare for the 
next oil spill.   
A.  Litigation Regarding Dispersants 
Several ongoing lawsuits could force more rigorous agency 
compliance with the ESA and the CWA. For example, on June 2, 2010, 
the Center for Biological Diversity (the Center) notified the EPA and the 
Coast Guard of its intent to sue for ESA violations related to the approval 
and use of chemical dispersants in the Gulf of Mexico.115 The Center 
alleged that dispersants may adversely affect multiple threatened and 
endangered species, including sea turtles, sperm whales, and Gulf 
sturgeon.116 The Center is currently in negotiations with the EPA and 
Coast Guard to compel their compliance with section 7 of the ESA by 
consulting with the Services in order to ensure that listing Corexit 
9500A, 9527A, and other dispersants in the NCP Product Schedule for 
use in oil spill response activities does not result in jeopardy to 
endangered species, or destruction or adverse modification of critical 
habitat. 
In separate litigation, on July 14, 2010, the Florida Wildlife 
Federation and the Gulf Restoration Network sued the EPA over its 
failure to disclose information about chemical dispersants.117 The 
complaint alleged that, in response to a Freedom of Information Act 
request, the EPA had disclosed the ingredients of chemical dispersants 
but refused to release requested health and safety information.118 
Resolution of this lawsuit could lead to more transparency in the 
approval process and use of dispersants. 
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Additionally, on October 13, 2010, a diverse group of organizations 
sent the EPA a petition to establish toxicity criteria and require toxicity 
testing and public disclosure of ingredients.119  On the same day, the 
same groups sent the EPA a notice of their intent to sue the EPA over its 
failure to perform nondiscretionary duties under the CWA.120  The 
groups specifically alleged that the EPA failed to publish a schedule 
identifying the waters in which dispersants, other chemicals, and other 
spill-mitigating devices and substances may be used and the quantities in 
which such substances can be used safely.121  The petition and any 
resulting litigation could lead to the EPA adopting better testing 
disclosure procedures with respect to the use of dispersants.  
B.  Dispersants Reform  
The government has begun the process of reviewing its regulations 
and existing ACPs and RCPs to reflect lessons learned during the 
Deepwater Horizon response.122 The EPA is currently working on 
revising the regulations regarding the use of dispersants and other 
chemicals and the NCP Product Schedule.123  On November 2, 2010, the 
EPA issued a memorandum announcing it was using information 
gathered as a result of the oil spill to engage federal partners via the NRT 
to reassess dispersant use guidelines under the NCP and to initiate review 
of the criteria and testing requirements for listing and delisting 
dispersants.124 The EPA requested that the regional administrators ensure 
RRT representatives work with RRT partners to: implement changes to 
ACPs and RCPs; develop a hierarchy of preferred oil spill response 
measures; provide site-specific and oil-specific rationale for conditions 
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or limitations for use of dispersants; create a process for evaluating use 
of dispersants; take steps to ensure data and decisions are transparent; 
and, as appropriate, reinitiate consultation on ACP/RCPs.125 These steps, 
if implemented, could lead to better management of the use of 
dispersants and a more protective regime for the environment and 
wildlife.  
While these efforts and ongoing litigation may lead to more 
protective measures, the EPA should reconsider whether dispersants are 
useful in light of the BP oil spill response efforts. The response activities 
raised many issues. For example, a pre-approval plan limit on the 
quantity of dispersants to be used appears to have been disregarded 
during the frantic response efforts. Perhaps a more effective scheme 
would result from tying the amount of dispersant use permitted to the 
amount of oil spilled or how close the spilled oil is to the shore.  
The Deepwater Horizon response also raised questions over the 
toxicity of oil dispersants and their placement on the EPA’s Product 
Schedule. Since the oil spill, the EPA has performed multi-phase toxicity 
testing for eight dispersants listed on the NCP Product Schedule.126 The 
testing found that the dispersants are of similar toxicity and that Corexit 
9500A is “generally no more or less toxic” than other available 
alternatives.127 In addition, no dispersant displayed biologically 
significant endocrine-disrupting activity, a concern raised by BP in its 
response to EPA’s May 20th directive to identify available dispersants 
below a specified toxicity level.128 These results stand in contrast to the 
data in the NCP Product Schedule, which indicated that some pre-
approved dispersants were both less toxic and more effective on LSC oil 
than Corexit 9500.129  
The fact that the EPA felt compelled to perform additional toxicity 
testing of dispersants on the Product Schedule in the midst of the oil spill 
and the fact that the results of that testing differed from the 
manufacturer-supplied data undermines the entire Product Schedule 
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testing and approval process. If the EPA continues to approve dispersants 
for use, it should strengthen the Product Schedule by independently 
testing dispersant toxicity and the potential for endocrine-disrupting 
activity before listing a dispersant. Toxicity testing should include testing 
on the long-term and sub-lethal effects of dispersant use, the 
environmental effects of dispersant-oil mixtures, and the effects of 
dispersants on a broader variety of species. A meaningful review of 
dispersants should also include consultation with the Services on the 
effects dispersants have on threatened and endangered wildlife before 
publication on the Product Schedule.  
If these efforts reveal greater impacts to wildlife and the environment 
than oil alone, the EPA should not permit dispersant use as an oil spill 
response measure. At the very least, the EPA should reconcile the fact 
that regulations prohibit the use of “sinking agents” as a response 
measure.130 These are prohibited because their impacts on productive 
benthic aquatic ecosystems would be greater than leaving the oil on the 
surface and because biodegradation at depth is slower due to reduced 
oxygen in bottom sediments.131 EPA should ask whether applying the 
dispersants subsea may have had the same impact as a sinking agent.  
PART V:  CONCLUSION 
BP’s use of dispersants, like the oil spill itself, was extraordinary. 
While the CWA and the ESA authorize the EPA to regulate the use of 
dispersants, it is evident that the development of contingency plans for 
oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico and the pre-spill consultation process for 
dispersants failed to protect the environment. Scientific research 
indicates that dispersants have a previously unknown impact on deep 
water ecosystems and may compromise marine wildlife. Future 
preparedness for major oil spills requires, at a minimum, better agency 
implementation of the existing laws and regulations. In the meantime, 
EPA should continue to investigate to what extent the use of dispersants 
is a viable oil spill response measure. 
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